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Abstract: Immigration is a prominent and contested global topic of contemporary politics. Several
recent popular votes targeting migration such as the minaret initiative, the automatic deportation
initiative, and most recently the vote on “mass immigration”, evoke however the impression that
Switzerland sets particularly harsh standards in migration policy. Based on historical evidence on
Swiss migration policy making and comparative analyses on current cantonal integration policy
outputs, I argue that - while far from being a new phenomenon - immigrant scepticism has become
a more relevant factor of Swiss migration policy making than ever. Yet, immigration and
immigrant scepticism do not only challenge direct democratic Switzerland, but all destination
countries of immigration.
KEYWORDS: Migration policy, direct democracy, immigrant scepticism, right-populist parties,
Switzerland
Introduction
Immigration is a prominent and contested topic of contemporary politics, not only in
Switzerland or Europe, but globally. In many countries, right-populist parties such as the
Front National, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), or the Swiss People’s
Party (SVP) successfully mobilize nationalist-conservative sentiments and fears against
immigration or supranational regulation among the population. The fact that even former
settler states such as Australia and the United States prominently discuss issues of asylum
seekers and illegal immigration today further highlights the relevance and contested nature
of the topic.
The international relevance of the subject notwithstanding, Switzerland seems to set
particularly harsh standards in restrictive migration policy making, which comprises fields
such as immigration (i.e. admission of immigrants to a country) or integration (i.e.
incorporation of resident immigrants) policy (Giugni and Passy 2006: 1, Lavenex 2004:
201). Latest example thereof is the recent narrow adoption of the initiative against “mass
immigration” in February 2014 (50,3 per cent yes-votes). Launched by the SVP, but
opposed by the whole political establishment, the result of this vote raised many questions,
such as what motivated the more than 20 per cent voters who are not SVP adherents to
support this initiative? What role did immigrant sceptic attitudes or fear of immigration
play here? Are the Swiss people, in spite of the countries’ famous humanitarian tradition,
particularly xenophobic?
The last question, which resonates in the title to this research note, was already
raised in 2007, when a journalist of the British Independent was concerned by the
drawing of a white sheep kicking a black sheep out of Switzerland. The contentious
1Published in Swiss Political Science Review (SPSR) 21, issue 1, 23-35, 2015,
which should be used for any reference to this work
drawing was used by the SVP to campaign for an initiative to deport criminal
foreigners, causing the UN’s special rapporteur on racism to ask for an official
explanation from the Swiss government.1 Eight years later, not only the automatic
deportation initiative, but also the initiative prohibiting the construction of minarets on
Swiss soil and the aforementioned initiative against “mass immigration” were adopted
by the Swiss people. Thus, questions as the ones mentioned above seem more salient
today than ever.
In this research note, I suggest that the result of the vote on “mass immigration” in
February 2014 was not that surprising, and that there were clear signs foreshadowing the
impressive success of the SVP initiative. I argue that immigration sceptic attitudes among
the population were fundamental for this success, which is in line with individual
analyses of the voting on “mass immigration” (Sciarini et al. 2014). These attitudes are
no new phenomenon. They represent cultural and symbolic resources (Skenderovic 2009),
which were, however, optimally mobilized by the right-populist SVP over the last twenty
years (Bornschier 2010, Kriesi et al. 2005). As a consequence, we observe today
immigrant sceptic voting even in fields such as immigration policy, which was
traditionally characterized by the “liberal paradox”, meaning the simplifying perspective
which identifies pro-immigration tendencies of the market and anti-immigration attitudes
among the population as the main drivers of immigration policy (Freeman 1995,
Lavenex 2004).
I refer to two types of evidence to substantiate my argument: Historical evidence as well
as current empirical evidence arising from cantonal migration policy making, where my
focus will be on cantonal integration policy outputs. With this approach, the research note
adds a macro-perspective to existing studies, which address the topic of migration policy,
and particularly the vote on “mass immigration” of February 2014, from an individual
(Sciarini et al. 2014) or micro-structural perspective (Hermann et al. 2014).
The following section sets the vote on “mass immigration” in a historical context.
Section three broadens the perspective and considers political actors involved in migration
policy making in Switzerland, which are typically neglected in this discussion, such as
moderate centrist or left-wing parties. The comparative analyses on cantonal integration
policy outputs presented in section four corroborate the relevance of immigrant scepticism
in contemporary Swiss migration policy making. The concluding discussion shows that
Switzerland is not significantly more or less xenophobic than other European countries,
but that direct democracy renders it just more visible.
From “overforeignization” to “mass immigration”
In spite of the SVP’s astonishing success with this topic today, national-conservative
debates about cultural demarcation are no new phenomenon, but resistance against
immigration and the so called “overforeignization” ( €Uberfremdung) by means of direct
democratic instruments have a long tradition in Switzerland (Mahnig and Piguet 2004,
Skenderovic 2009: 49). The most famous example is the first Schwarzenbach-initiative
voted in 1970, which aimed at a reduction of the immigrant share from then 17 per cent to
10 per cent. Neither the Schwarzenbach-initiative, nor several follow-up initiatives aiming
1 Vallely, Paul (2007): “Switzerland, Europe’s heart of darkness?”, reprinted in the Belfast Telegraph, September 7, 2007.
Online: http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/switzerland-europes-heart-of-darkness-28062699.html (last
accessed: January 9, 2015).
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at a restriction of immigration could gain a popular majority. However, the close result of
the Schwarzenbach vote (46 per cent yes-votes) as well as the permanent politicization of
the topic in the direct-democratic arena is assumed to have had an indirect restrictive
impact on Swiss migration policy in the subsequent years, when the Swiss government
defined quotas on annual immigration (Giugni and Passy 2006: 15, Mahnig and Piguet
2004, Skenderovic and D’Amato 2008: 225).
Turning to the end of the 20th century and the surge of the SVP as a right-populist
contender on the party political landscape, one must say that the SVP mobilized primarily
symbolic as well as cultural resources which were already firmly established in Swiss
society (Skenderovic 2009: 47). However, conflicts around cultural openness and closure
became much more salient in the early 21st century. According to this perspective, the
success of the SVP in Switzerland as well as of other right-populist parties all over Europe
is first of all the result of a global social change and a new cultural conflict between losers
and winners of globalization (Arzheimer 2009, Kriesi et al. 2006). Like no other party in
Switzerland, the SVP successfully mobilized the losers of globalization with its
protectionist and national-conservative political agenda (Bornschier 2010). Throughout the
surge of the SVP as a national right-populist contender, direct democracy played an
important role to promote the SVP’s national-conservative agenda (Kriesi et al. 2005,
Skenderovic 2009: 147f).
Returning to the present, the scatter plots in Figure 1 show that cantonal results of
the vote on “mass immigration” are not only highly correlated, as one would expect,
with other votes on topics related to immigration, such as the vote on the free
movement of people from 2009, the ECOPOP initiative from 2014, or the deportation
initiative from 2010. Bivariate correlations are equally pronounced between the “mass
immigration” vote and the minaret vote from 2009, which does not concern immigration
but the regulation of religious minority rights (cf. Freitag and Rapp 2013). Thus, even
the rather crude aggregate cantonal vote results show a clear pattern, suggesting that the
three different SVP votes were mainly driven by one and the same factor, immigrant
scepticism.
This interpretation is in line with individual and micro-structural analyses of the vote on
“mass immigration”. According to Sciarini et al. (2014) and Hermann el al. (2014),
individual and communal vote decisions were strongly influenced by opposing attitudes
towards immigration. Analyses based on Swiss survey data show that already in 2013
roughly 51 per cent of the interviewed individuals stated that immigration should be
reduced (Ackermann and Freitag 2015). Although prominently discussed in the forefront
to the vote (Bernhard et al. 2014), other factors such as the economic benefits of
immigration, but also the ecological lack of space argument (“Dichtestress”) played only a
subordinate role in this vote (Hermann et al. 2014, Sciarini et al. 2014).
Political actors and their positions towards immigration
Especially in consensual Switzerland with its strong power sharing institutions (Vatter
2008), policy making does not occur in an experimental-like context with clearly
identifiable treatment variables, but it is the result of diverging and competing interests.
This section draws a more comprehensive picture of the political actors involved in
migration policy making in Switzerland, paying particular attention to political
mainstream parties, which are often neglected in this debate. To delimit the discussion in a
meaningful way, I only focus on the major parties as they are represented in the Federal
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Council.2 Besides the SVP, the discussion includes the centrist parties FDP.The Liberals
and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) plus the leftist Social Democrats (SP).
In addition, I refer to trade associations and unions as important non-partisan actors in
Swiss migration policy making. I will also try to match parties’ positions regarding the
initiative on “mass immigration” with their ideological profiles regarding immigration,
which are not as evident as it might seem, given the long neglect of the immigration topic
by mainstream parties (Freeman 1995: 885, Mahnig 2001, but see Ruedin 2013). Yet, with
Figure 1: Free movement of people and immigrant sceptic votes from 2009 to 2014
Notes: Illustrated are bivariate correlations, *** (Pearson’s r) denotes a significance level of p < 0.001.
Data: Swiss Federal Statistical Office.
2 I will not consider the Conservative Democratic Party (BDP) here, since it is not a major party and due to its
only recent independence from the SVP.
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immigration becoming an increasingly relevant topic on the new cleavage between cultural
demarcation and openness, mainstream parties are more and more forced to take a
position in this regard.
The Swiss People’s Party (SVP)
Since the SVP’s transformation into a right-populist catch-all party in the late 1990’s, the
party represents a decisive immigrant sceptic ideology, and it is the only major party
occupying the national-conservative pole on the new cleavage. This immigration critical
stance reflects emblematically in the initiative on “mass immigration” launched by the
SVP. With this initiative, the SVP played the card of the opposition party, since not only
all major parties opposed the initiative, but also the federal council, the parliament, as well
as trade associations and unions (Bernhard et al. 2014). Adherents to the SVP almost
unanimously supported the initiative (Sciarini et al. 2014).
Centrist parties: FDP.The Liberals and the Christian Democratic People’s Party
(CVP)
Traditionally, the position of centrist mainstream parties regarding immigration was one
of issue avoidance (Freeman 1995, Kriesi et al. 2006, Mahnig 2001). As their closest
neighbours, centrist parties may be the first actors to be attracted by the success of right-
populist parties (Bale et al. 2010, Kriesi et al. 2006). There are signs of such an
approximation of the centrist parties, surprisingly especially the FDP, to the restrictive
immigration stance of the SVP (B€uhlmann and Gerber forthcoming), suggesting that
economic liberalism does not necessarily imply cultural liberalism. The results of the vote
on “mass immigration” confirm this indecisive stance of centrist parties regarding
immigration with a slight pro-SVP tendency among the FDP: While 66 per cent of CVP
supporters rejected the initiative, only 60 per cent of FDP adherents did so (Sciarini et al.
2014).
The Social Democratic Party (SP)
Social democratic parties such as the SP in Switzerland represent the most prominent
counterpart of the SVP on the new cleavage. With their culturally liberal and pluralistic
ideology, leftist mainstream parties are considered the most important allies of immigrants
(Giugni and Passy 2006: 198, Janoski 2010). This interpretation is further supported by the
increasing literature on immigrants’ political attitudes and behaviour which shows that -
although immigrants are far from being a homogeneous group in this respect - immigrant
voters are often inclined to favour leftist parties (cf. Dancygier and Saunders 2006, Strijbis
2014). In line with this inclusive orientation, the initiative on “mass immigration” was
massively rejected by adherents to the SP (Sciarini et al. 2014).
Trade associations and unions
With their focus on the economic benefits of the free movement of workers, trade
associations are the most important non-partisan supporters of the free movement of
people (Bernhard et al. 2014: 33, Lavenex and Manatschal 2014: 678). Trade unions are
more divided when it comes to immigration, but they have become important advocates
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of resident immigrant interests (Giugni and Passy 2006: 15, Ireland 1994: 6).
Switzerland’s largest trade union Unia even characterizes itself as the “biggest immigrant
organization” in Switzerland.3 It comes to no surprise that both trade associations and
unions clearly opposed the initiative on “mass immigration” before the vote (Bernhard
et al. 2014: 6).
Empirical evidence: Cantonal integration policy outputs
In the remainder of this research note, I combine the theoretical insights from the
preceding sections and put them under closer scrutiny. In other words, I test to what
extent Swiss migration policy is the dynamic result of competing party political or
advocacy group interests, or to what extent these policies reflect established and stable
cultural notions of belonging in terms of inclusive or exclusive attitudes towards
foreigners. My analytical focus is on one specific aspect of migration policy making in
Switzerland, cantonal integration policy outputs. I use the integration policy index
developed by Manatschal (2011, 2013) comprising seven components of integration policy:
access to nationality, political participation rights, access to cantonal employment, family
reunion, anti-discrimination, cultural obligations and religious rights. Positive values on
this index represent more liberal or multicultural policies, whereas negative values stand
for more restrictive or assimilationist policies.4 The subnational analytical level allows me
to keep the focus on the Swiss case while taking a comparative perspective with the 26
cantons approximating a most similar systems design.
Figure 2 shows the results of the two OLS regression models, with Model 1 representing
the party dynamic perspective, whereas Model 2 visualizes the path dependent model (for
details on all variables, data and operationalization, see Table A1 in the appendix). A look
at Model 1 reveals that party ideology indeed seems to affect cantonal integration policy
outputs, and it does so largely in line with theoretical expectations. Cantons with a strong
SVP formulate more restrictive integration policies, which corroborates existing research
reporting a restrictive impact of right-populist party ideology on migration policy making
(Howard 2010, Koopmans et al. 2012). Likewise, a strong cantonal representation of the
FDP coincides with more restrictive or exclusive integration policies revealing a liberal
conservative orientation of the FDP. As concerns the field of cantonal integration policy,
there are signs of an ideological approximation of the FDP to the SVP in matters of
migration.
The indecisive stance of the second centrist mainstream party, the CVP, in turn, does
also show up when it comes to cantonal integration policy, as the coefficient is negative,
but not significant. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the leftist SP fails conventional
statistical significance levels, although it points in the expected positive direction. Instead,
trade unions evolve as powerful representatives of immigrant interests, as their
organizational density coincides with more liberal or inclusive cantonal integration
policies. Considering that immigrants live concentrated in urban cantons (Pearson’s
r = 0.66, significant at the 0.1 per cent level), the positive coefficient for urbanization
suggests a pragmatic and liberal approach of urban cantons to the challenge of integration
(cf. Wichmann et al. 2011), yet it is not significant in this model.
3 See http://www.unia.ch/de/ueber-uns/interessengruppen/migration/ (last accessed: January 15, 2015).
4 For a detailed discussion of all components, indicators and sub-indicators of this cantonal integration policy
index, see also Manatschal (2013).
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Model 2 in Figure 2 is motivated by the assumption that the party political story told
by Model 1 may be incomplete. Two indicators capture the idea that cantonal integration
policies reflect established cantonal understandings of integration (Brubaker 1992, Favell
2001, Ireland 1994), and are thus path dependent: Immigrant scepticism as an indicator
for the cantonal social consensus on integration (Favell 2001: 28) and the cultural-
linguistic heritage of a canton. Influenced by the culture of adjacent countries through the
common language, French-speaking cantons should exhibit more liberal integration
policies, inspired by France’s jus soli citizenship conception. German-speaking cantons
(plus Italian-speaking Ticino), in turn, are expected to have more restrictive integration
policies, which correspond more closely to Germany’s (and Italy’s) restrictive jus sanguinis
citizenship tradition (Cattacin and Kaya 2005, Zincone and Basili 2010).
As Model 2 shows, especially immigrant scepticism evolves as a significant negative
predictor of cantonal integration policy. The path dependent factor language region points
into the expected positive direction, yet it slightly fails the 10 per cent significance level.
Conversely, the dominant party political factors from Model 1, i.e. the vote shares of SVP
and FDP, both lose their explanatory power in this comprehensive model. As further tests
showed, SP and CVP vote shares remain insignificant in this path-dependent specification
(not reported here). These findings suggest that established cultural notions of inclusion or
exclusion are a stronger predictor of restrictive integration policy making than the more
volatile electoral strength of specific parties. The coefficient for urbanization is now also
significant and positive.
Figure 2: Predictors of cantonal integration policy outputs
Notes: Reported values are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients with 90 and 95 per cent
confidence intervals. N (Model 1 and Model 2) = 25, with Appenzell Inner Rhodes (AI) as the only
missing case in both models, since there are no parties elected in parliament, and hence, no vote-share
available for this canton. Variance explained amounts to R2 = 0.88 (Model 1) and 0.90 (Model 2).
Robust standard errors (hc3) were calculated to deal with heteroscedasticity. Multicollinearity was
tested for by the computation of uncentred variance inflation factors (VIF), with factors > 5 considered
critical. The results of both Models remain robust to the exclusion of influential cases (Cook’s D
statistics).
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In spite of these clear empirical results, the analytical models presented here suffer from
certain limitations. The number of 25 cases (all cantons with the exception of Appenzell
Inner Rhodes, cf. note to Figure 2) is relatively small, and it implies that the inclusion of
explanatory factors in the analytical models is necessarily selective. Yet, all results are
highly robust to the exclusion of influential observations, and using classical or robust
standard errors makes no difference. Alternative models (not reported here) further
confirm the robustness of the findings, showing, for instance, that cantonal integration
policy making is not related to governmental party representation, corroborating the
restricted influence of parties in consensual governments (Schmidt 2002). What is more,
integration policy outputs are not related to bare immigrant shares. Yet, as suggested
above, the presence of immigrants may have an indirect liberalizing effect on integration
policy through urbanization.
Another challenge regards multicollinearity. Especially language region relates to several
central factors under consideration, such as the SVP’s vote share (Pearsons’r = -0.59,
significant at the 0.1 per cent level), or union density (Pearsons’r = 0.52, significant at the
0.1 per cent level). While the use of Variance Inflated Factors (cf. note to Figure 2) helps
to deal with this challenge analytically, it does not solve it. However, additional analyses
isolating the cultural-linguistic effect, which base on German-speaking cantons plus Ticino
only, confirm the robustness of the empirical findings presented in this research note, most
importantly the negative relationship between immigrant sceptic attitudes and cantonal
integration policy outputs.
Conclusion
Throughout this research note, I have developed the argument that the outcome of the
vote on “mass immigration” was not so unexpected, but rather reflected the increasing
importance and contested nature of topics like immigration and immigrants in
contemporary destination countries of immigration. Far from being a new phenomenon,
fears of immigration and its consequences are pronounced again very prominently today,
not only in Switzerland, but internationally. Right-populist parties exploit these fears most
successfully, and they dominate the political migration discourse with their decisive anti-
immigrant stance. Yet, the result on the vote against “mass immigration” as well as the
empirical evidence on cantonal integration policy making presented in this research note
suggest that immigrant scepticism plays a more decisive role in Swiss migration policy
making than mere right-populist party adherence.
The question whether popular initiatives opposing immigration really translate into
more restrictive immigration policies requires rigorous scientific scrutiny, and future votes
on the topic need to show whether we can speak of a trend. The result of the “mass
immigration” initiative however suggests that the liberal paradox lost its relevance and
that immigrant sceptic attitudes evolve as the most important challenge of immigration
policy. This interpretation is in line with individual and communal analyses on the vote
against “mass immigration” (Hermann et al. 2014: 6, Sciarini et al. 2014). In this sense,
immigration policy would resemble more and more typical fields of migration policy like
integration policy, which reflects more strongly cultural understandings of belonging and,
thus, of including or excluding attitudes towards immigrants (Brubaker 1992, Favell 2001,
Ireland 1994).
So far so good, but how should we explain the clear rejection (only 25,9 per cent yes-
votes) of the similar but more far-reaching proposal against immigration by the
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association for the environment and the population (ECOPOP) in November 2014? A
straightforward answer is that the demands of ECOPOP were all too similar to the already
accepted vote on “mass immigration” only nine months earlier, but at the same time too
extreme, as even the SVP opposed the initiative. Yet, like the very narrow result of the
initiative on “mass immigration” itself, this clear counter-reaction in the ECOPOP vote
reflects first of all the polarized and divisive nature of the topic among Swiss voters.
This brings me back to the initial title question: Are Swiss citizens more xenophobic
than citizens of other countries? Most probably not. Although Switzerland exhibits one of
the highest levels of resident immigrants and immigrant influx in international
comparisons, immigrant scepticism in Switzerland is, if at all, below European average
(Meuleman et al. 2009, Pehrson et al. 2009). What sets Switzerland apart from other
European societies is that, thanks to direct democracy and popular votes on these topics,
immigrant scepticism is more overtly visible. Whether consensual, majoritarian, direct
democratic or representative, it seems like the litmus test of contemporary democracies
consists in recognizing the fact that they are countries of immigration, while at the same
time acknowledging and taking seriously the concerns and fears of the native population.
This is certainly no easy task. Nevertheless, the movement against the anti-Islamist
movement Pegida5 in Germany and the immediate public condemnation of the Islamist
terrorist attacks against the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo by French Muslims show
that democracy and freedom of expression are favourable strategies to address this
challenge.
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Appendix
Table A1: Variables, operationalization and data
Variable Descriptives Operationalization / Source
Dependent variable
Cantonal integration
policy index
Mean: 0.00
SD: 0.35
Min.: -
0.54
Max.:
0.76
Standardized additive index covering the years 2005 to 2008
including the policy components access to nationality,
political participation rights, access to cantonal employment,
family reunion, anti-discrimination, cultural obligations and
religious rights. Source: Manatschal (2013).
Independent variable
French-speaking Mean:
18.51
SD: 32.82
Min.: 0.20
Max.:
90.00
Percentage of cantonal French speaking population 2001.
Source: Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
Immigrant sceptic
attitudes
Mean:
37.86
SD: 6.75
Min.:
25.13
Max.:
51.35
Share (per cent) of opposing respondents to the question: “are
you in favour of equal opportunities for Swiss citizens and
non-nationals”? Cantonal mean for the years ‘95, ‘99, ‘03 and
‘07. Source: SELECTS.
SVP vote share Mean:
19.46
SD: 8.46
Min.: 0.00
Max.:
41.00
Electoral strength of the Swiss People’s Party
(SVP) 2003, in per cent. Source: Federal
Statistical Office (BFS).
FDP vote share Mean:
23.26
SD: 6.22
Min.:
11.20
Max.:
35.20
Electoral strength of the Liberal Democratic
Party (FDP.The Liberals) 2003, in per cent.
Source: Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
CVP vote share Mean:
22.92
SD: 15.92
Min.: 0.00
Max.:
54.10
Electoral strength of the Christian
Democratic Party (CVP) 2003, in per cent.
Source: Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
SP vote share Mean:
19.46
SD: 8.46
Min.: 0.00
Max.:
41.00
Electoral strength of the Social
Democratic Party (SP) 2003, in per cent.
Source: Federal Statistical Office (BFS).
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Table A1: Continued
Variable Descriptives Operationalization / Source
Union density Mean:
10.74
SD: 7.69
Min.: 1.42
Max.:
33.00
Cantonal share of union members of the total
working population, 2003. Sources:
SGB (2004), BADAC, own calculations.
Urbanization Mean:
54.63
SD: 30.78
Min.: 0.00
Max.:
100.00
Cantonal degree of urbanization (in per cent), 2001. Source:
BADAC.
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